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Most economic analyses assume that risk aversion is constant over the lifecycle,
though an emerging body of empirical literature has provided contradictory evi-
dence. This paper contributes to the literature by developing a theoretical model
of the relationship between health and risk preferences and evaluating the model
with an improved measure of risk preferences and an instrumental variables model.
I find that health has an inverse relationship with risk aversion, but the effect of a
health shock is sensitive to risk preference measurement, which explains the range
of findings in the literature.
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At the root of most economic analyses is decision-making. When modeling how
economic agents make decisions, economists make assumptions about risk pref-
erences, typically captured by the curvature of utility functions. Most economic
models assume that relative risk aversion is constant over the lifecycle. This as-
sumption has persisted in theoretical economic modeling because of its precedent
in the literature and the scarcity of elicited risk preferences data. However, an
emerging body of literature on risk preferences shows that shocks such as mar-
riage, childbirth, illness, violence, natural disasters, and family loss impact risk
preferences (Decker and Schmitz, 2016; Gloede et al. , 2015; Gorlitz, 2019; Ket-
tlewell, 2019), though the size of the effect is unclear (Chang 2015). Conclusive
evidence of non-constant risk aversion would call into question the assumption of
constant relative risk aversion.
Most studies evaluating the variance of risk preferences include health as one
of the primary covariates (Dohneman et al. 2011, Sahm 2012, Decker and Schmitz
2016, Kettlewell 2019). However, none have explained why health might be theo-
retically important to risk preferences. I propose two theories. First, that individ-
uals have risk preferences regarding health because individuals derive utility from
health (as they do income) and future health is uncertain. I develop this theory
and discuss evidence for it in the literature, but I do not have the data to em-
pirically test it. Second, income (or wealth) risk preferences may be health-state
dependent. A health shock may cause cognitive decline, elevated stress, negative
emotions, or a change in subjective life expectations, all of which have been shown
to impact risk preferences.
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I expect risk aversion to vary with income and health. However, the constant
relative risk aversion assumption implies that risk aversion is constant with respect
to income. To empirically test the null hypothesis that risk aversion is constant
with respect to income, I regress risk aversion on income and I find that neither
higher order terms or a log transformation of income are significant, so I fail to
reject the null hypothesis of constant relative risk aversion. I use instrumental
variables to test for endogeneity of income and health. Then, I assume a constant
relative risk aversion functional form for the elicitaton of relative risk parameters.
Experiencing a health shock increases relative risk aversion by 30% of a stan-
dard deviation for individuals with graduate degrees, but variation in health ex-
plains little of the variation in risk preferences. Together with the empirical liter-
ature, these findings provide conclusive evidence that health and risk aversion are
inversely related, but health is not the most important predictor of risk preferences.
I find that the health-risk preferences relationship is sensitive to measurement of
risk preferences, which explains the range of findings in the literature. I propose
several methodological changes that could advance the literature moving forward.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on risk preference
theory. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature on the relationship between
health and risk preferences. Section 4 develops a theoretical model for how health
might relate to risk preferences. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 details the
empirical model. Section 7 describes the elicitation of risk preferences. Section 8
explains the results and Section 9 discusses the implications.
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2 Background
Economists model risk preferences as the curvature of an individual’s utility func-
tion. An individual can have risk-averse, risk-loving, or risk-neutral preferences.
Most empirical studies find that the mean individual is risk averse, and thus refer
to risk preferences as risk aversion. Risk aversion can be represented as absolute
preferences or as preferences relative to the wealth of the individual. Absolute risk
aversion (ARA) captures how much individuals invest in risky assets. Specifically,





In this specification, ARA is dependent on an individual’s wealth. Assuming
decreasing marginal utility of wealth (e.g., U(w) = ln(w)), a wealthy individual
will be more willing to take financial risks because they will lose less utility for a
given loss than an individual with less wealth. Economists are also interested in
relative risk aversion (RRA), which captures the porportion of assets invested in





Individuals with RRA(w) > 0 invest a greater portion of their wealth in risky
assets as they become wealthier, while individuals with RRA(w) < 0 invest a
smaller proportion of their wealth in risky assets. RRA allows economists to think
of an individual’s risk preferences as a personality trait that is expressed differently
depending on an individual’s income. Accordingly, it is popular to assume constant
7
relative risk aversion, which does not allow an individual’s risk preferences to vary






where α is a constant equal to the relative risk aversion parameter, ρ. When α
=1,
U(w) = ln(w). (4)
When we apply Equation 2 using the utility function specified in Equation 3, we
find that relative risk aversion is equal to the constant α. This neoclassical central
tendency theory assumes that risk preferences are perfectly constant over time and
context (e.g., Sahm, 2012).
The primary competing theory of the stability of risk preferences is the distri-
bution theory. The distribution theory holds that risk preferences have a mean
tendency but have two sources of variation: daily, mood-based fluctuations that
cause small, frequent variation and exogenous, traumatic shocks that shift an in-
dividual’s mean risk attitude (Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018). Anderson et al. (2008)
finds that risk preferences are stable but sensitive to changes in financial status.
However, findings from empirical tests of risk preference stability are mixed and
inconclusive (Chuang and Schechter, 2015). Schildberg-Hörisch (2018) concludes
that “individual risk preferences are moderately stable over time and sufficiently
persistent to be considered an individual trait. However, their degree of stability
is too low to be reconciled with the assumption of perfect stability in neoclassical
economic theory. Moreover, because change in risk preferences is systematic, it
should not be dismissed as meaningless noise” (p. 142). This study aims to further
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elucidate these potential systematic changes.
The literature is further divided over the stability of risk preferences across con-
texts. The four domains commonly considered are financial, recreational, health
and social contexts. Here there are three competing theories. The neoclassical the-
ory assumes that risk preferences are universal across contexts (Finkelstein, 2012).
Dohmen et al. (2011) find that a core risk preference is mostly consistent across
domains, though preferences may vary slightly according to the context. On the
other hand, the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) theory argues risk atti-
tudes are completely dependent on context (Weber and Blais, 2002, 2006; Hanoch
et al., 2006). Weber and Blais (2006) suggest using a risk-return model, such as
the DOSPERT scale, in order to account for these contextual differences. This
study tests the null hypothesis that risk preferences behave according to the neo-
classical theory, with the alternative hypothesis that, though core risk preferences
are relatively constant, they vary over health contexts. Due to data limitations, I
cannot consider the DOSPERT theory.
These various models of risk preference can be incorporated into different the-
ories of decision-making. Expected utility theory and prospect theory are the two
primary economic models of decision-making under uncertainty. Expected utility
theory holds that utility is a function of risk attitudes and expectations are based
on known probabilities of uncertain events. Tversky and Kahneman (1979) show
that expected utility theory is inconsistent with their findings of decision-making
heuristics. They proposed prospect theory as an alternative. Individuals under-
estimate probabilities close to one and overestimate probabilities close to zero.
Therefore, individuals use subjective, distorted probabilities when making deci-
sions instead of the accurate probabilities that expected utility theory assumes.
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Additionally, individuals focus only on relative gains and losses (the isolation ef-
fect) and weight losses more than gains (loss aversion), creating inconsistent pref-
erences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1992). Prospect theory addresses these
concerns by using subjective decision weights instead of actual probabilities and
focusing on relative change rather than the final value (Tversky and Kahneman,
1979). Prospect theory is especially relevant to the discussion of risk aversion
because Tversky and Kahneman (1992) find that risk attitudes depend on the
direction and magnitude of change in wealth (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). De-
spite recognizing the importance of Tversky and Kahneman’s findings, most of
the economics literature follows the expected utility tradition (e.g., Barsky et al.,
1997). Some risk preference studies also consider a rank-dependent utility model
(e.g., Harrison and Ng, 2016). This study assumes the expected utility model
when describing individual decision-making.
3 Literature Review
In this section, I review the literature on the measures of risk preferences employed
in the literature and the empirical evidence for the relationship between health and
risk preferences.
3.1 Risk Preference Measurement
Risk preferences can be measured with experimental or survey tools. Experimental
methods elicit risk preferences by having participants play a gambling game and
recording the level of risk they are willing to take on (experimental method). Sur-
vey tools either directly ask participants to rank their general willingness to take
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risks (general willingness method) or approximate the experimental method with a
series of questions, usually about insurance (hybrid method). Schildberg-Hörisch
(2018) finds that the general willingness survey tool is a better predictor of risky
behavior than the experimental method, but does not review the hybrid method.
Dave et al. (2010) finds that more complex risk preference eliciation questions,
such as the hybrid and gamble questions, have better predictive accuracy. Rele-
vant psychology literature uses alternate methods, such as skin conductance tests,
which have been used adventagously along with gamble responses (Ottaviani and
Vandone, 2015). This study uses the hybrid method with an updated question
format that measures risk attitudes with greater precision, as described in Section
5.2.
Longitudinal data with multiple observations of risk aversion are rare. Most
studies use the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), which includes experimen-
tal and general willingness measures, or the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
from the U.S., which has a hybrid measure that tests willingness to gamble lifetime
income. Both of these data sets include health measures and have been used to
test health as a determinant of risk aversion. Findings from these studies may not
be directly comparable to each other due to measurement differences. This study
uses two measures of risk preferences, one which could plausibly compared with the
general willingness measure from the SOEP, and one which is directly comparable
to the elicited risk measure Sahm (2012) calculates from the HRS data.
The first measure is respondents’ willingness to pay for health insurance in
a given hypothetical scenario. The dollar amount individuals are willing to pay
relative to the actuarially fair price of health insurance is an indicator of the
respondents’ risk preferences. This measure may be comparable to the general
11
willingness question, but it only measures risk preferences with regard to income,
whereas the general willingness question measures risk preferences across all do-
mains. For the main results, I use this measure of raw risk preferences to calculate
a relative risk aversion parameter for every individual in Section 7.2. An individ-
ual’s elicited risk preferences represent the curvature of their utility function with
respect to income and can be compared to other studies in the literature. How-
ever, calculating the relative risk aversion parameter requires the assumption of a
functional form of an individual’s utility function with respect to wealth. All of
the studies in the literature that calculate the relative risk aversion parameter (i.e.,
Sahm, 2012; Cassar et al., 2017; Harrison and Ng 2016) assume a functional form
compatible with constant relative risk aversion (specifically, Equation 3). Before
adopting this assumption, I use raw risk preferences as the dependent variable to
test the assumption of constant relative risk aversion with respect to income in
Section 7.1.
3.2 Health and Risk Preferences
The empirical literature on health and risk aversion tests both heterogeneity of risk
preferences across health status and a causal link between health shocks and risk
aversion. The literature on the former is relatively thin. Dohmen et al. (2011) find
that health status is negatively correlated with risk aversion, but does not account
for endogeneity. Sahm (2012) presents the strongest evidence, using HRS data to
estimate a maximum likelihood model that allows for constant and time-varying
determinants of risk aversion. She finds no significant difference in risk preferences
across estimated likelihood of having had a serious health condition. However,
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this finding may be due to her measurement of health, as she does not include for
measures such as self-reported health status. This study adds to the literature by
using an instrumental variables model to address the endogeneity of health and
uses more comprehensive health measures.
Sahm (2012) and Decker and Schmitz (2016) find that a health shock increases
an individual’s risk aversion. Sahm finds that having had a serious health con-
dition has a significant, direct, negative effect on risk tolerance, controlling for a
set of covariates and past risk aversion. Those who had a health condition were
15 percent more risk averse than those who had not. Decker and Schmitz (2016)
use the SOEP to test the impact of health shocks on risk aversion. Unlike Sahm
(2012), health is measured objectively via grip strength instead of self-reported
conditions and a general willingness survey measure is used to measure risk at-
titudes. Decker and Schmitz (2016) employ regression-adjusted propensity score
matching to create treatment and control groups and select covariates with a dou-
ble lasso procedure. Decker and Schmitz (2016) find that a health shock has a
significant, negative impact (11 percent of a standard deviation) on risk willing-
ness that lasts at least four years and is robust to multiple sensitivity checks. Due
to methodological differences between the two studies, the size of the effects can-
not be directly compared. Sahm concludes that this effect is relatively small and
therefore supports the central tendency model of risk preferences, while Decker
and Schmitz consider the effect to be substantial. Decker and Schmitz show that
their findings vary across measures of health shocks. Using data from Australia,
Kettlewell (2009) finds that a health shock has no significant effect on financial
risk preferences.
This study contributes to the literature on how risk preferences vary with
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health status by using more comprehensive health measures and accounting for
endogeneity. This study aims to fill the gap between the theoretical literature on
risk preferences and empirical literature on health and risk aversion by developing
a theoretical model that relates health and risk aversion.
4 Theoretical Model
This section aims to answer the question: theoretically, how might health be
related to risk aversion? Recent empirical literature tests the impact of health
shocks on risk aversion, but does not develop a theoretical relationship between
health and risk aversion. Finkelstein et al. (2009) examines potential mechanisms
for the health-state dependence of the utility function, but does not focus on risk
preferences. Health is endogenous and may impact other choice variables that
may impact risk preferences, such as employment, which determines individual
income. Likewise, health may impact marital status, which determines household
income. Or health may impact productivity and, thus, wages. However, Decker
and Schmidtz (2016) test income as a mediator of the effect of health changes on
risk aversion and find it explains only a small proportion of the effect of health
on risk attitudes. Additionally, the marginal utility of income may vary by health
(Finkelstein et al. 2009). Significant interactions between income and health in
a model estimating income risk preferences would lend support to this theory.
However, health may have a more direct effect.
I explore in greater depth two ways that health might relate to risk preferences.
Theory 1 is that future health is uncertain and individuals exhibit aversion to
health risk independent of income risk preferences. Theory 2 is that health relates
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to risk preferences because income risk preferences are health state-dependent. I
explore Theory 1 and assess its viability with a review of the relevant empirical
literature. Then, I elaborate on Theory 2 and evaluate it with my data.
4.1 Theory 1: Independent Health Risk Preferences
Generally, risk preferences are applied to wealth gains and losses. An analogous
model can be applied to health. Like income or wealth, health may vary unex-
pectedly.
In a simple Grossman model of demand for health (Grossman, 1972), individ-
uals receive utility from the services of health, ht, which depend on one’s stock of
health capital, Ht, where f(∗) is a technology that converts Ht into the services of
health; that is
ht = f(Ht). (5)
The technology f(∗) may depend on age and be specified as ft(∗).
Grossman assumes decreasing marginal returns to health, implying U ′(ht) > 0
and U ′′(ht) < 0 and therefore assuming risk-avoidant preferences with regard to
health.1 Following this assumption, I can specify a utility function in which the
risk aversion parameter αH captures health risk aversion rather than income risk
aversion, α = αW , or
U = U(ht, Ct;α
H , αW ), (6)
where αH is the health risk aversion parameter. However, one cannot grow health
1Grossman considers individual decisionmaking in the context of lifetime utility and does not
allow for uncertainty. I assume that the utility function is additively separable (and discounted)
across time periods, which allows me to consider the functional form of an individual’s per-period
utility function, and I extend the model to allow for uncertainty.
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by investing it as one invests wealth. Unlike wealth, health naturally depreciates.2
In order to maintain or grow their stock of health, individuals invest in health
production. For example,
Ht+1 = It + (1− δt)Ht, (7)
where It represents investment and δt is a natural rate of depreciation. According
to Grossman’s model, individuals invest in health by consuming medical care, Mt,






All individuals have the same amount of time in a year, Ω, but that time can be









Individuals grow their proportion of healthy days by investing in health. We can
2Arguably, wealth also depreciates. If one saved cash instead of saving their money in a bank,
such that their wealth did not grow with interest, their wealth would depreciate due to inflation.
However, health is still distinct in that the depreciation rate varies across individuals as well as
over time.
3The marginal productivity of one’s time using medical care may depend on one’s education,
E.
4Note that ht = f(Ht) = Ω
H
t , enters the utility function, so individuals gain utility from
having more healthy days as well as more time (that they can use for utility-gaining activities)
when they invest in their health.
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Healthier people have more time to work (to produce income that can be re-
invested in medical care) or to do what makes them happy. Unlike wealth, there is
an upper bound on this growth (i.e. 365 days in a year). However, healthy people
also have higher life expectancies. To complete the analogy to income: one of the
ways an individual invests in their health is by spending time on health-producing
activities, THt , so when individuals invest time in their health, they receive a return




In this case, an individual’s degree of absolute health risk aversion (AHRA)
defines how much time and income an individual is willing to invest in their health
as their health changes. For instance, an individual with increasing AHRA will
spend more time exercising and eating well the healthier they are. An individual
with decreasing AHRA will spend less time exercising and eating well the healthier
they are (and will be more willing to engage in risky health behaviors, such as
smoking).
Relative health risk aversion (RHRA) defines the proportion of their time
and income that individuals spend on health-producing activities as their health
changes. While one’s time in a year does not change as one’s health changes, the
proportion of days an individual “loses” to bad health is inversely proportional
to health, so one can think of the amount of healthy time increasing as health
increases. Individuals with greater RHRA will spend a greater proportion of their
time on health-producing behaviors as their health increases. Assuming decreas-
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ing marginal utility of health, healthy individuals will experience a smaller drop
in utility for a given health change than an individual in poor health.
We have established theoretically that an individual might have risk prefer-
ences with regard to their health as well as their wealth. Now I consider if in-
dividuals have the same risk preferences with regard to both health and wealth
(H0 : α
H=αW ), or if there are domain-specific preferences. There is some ev-
idence in the literature that risk preferences with regard to health are distinct
from income risk preferences. Weber and Blais (2006) and Dohmen et al. (2011)
find differences in risk preferences between health contexts and financial, recre-
ational, and social contexts. Weber and Blais (2006) elicit domain-specific risk
preferences in the investing, gambling, health, recreational, and social domains.
They find that individuals take the most risks in the health-safety domain, despite
perceiving the highest risks in that domain. This finding would be consistent with
high willingness to pay for health insurance and high risk factors. Dohemen et al.
(2011) employ SOEP data, which includes self-reported measures of risk willing-
ness generally, and in car driving, financial matters, recreation, career, and health
matters. They find a substantial correlation (.4768) between willingness to take
risks in health contexts and general risk willingness. However, that correlation is
the lowest correlation between general risk willingness and a specific domain and
the lowest correlation between health risk willingness and other domains. Health
risk willingness was found to be the best predictor of smoking but a weak predic-
tor of investment behavior, sports activity, and self-employment. These findings
indicate risk willingness in the health context has the most independent variation.
These findings suggest that individuals do have preferences regarding health that
are independent from income preferences.
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This finding has important theoretical consequences. We can apply this find-
ing to the model of demand for health insurance. According to the basic eco-
nomic model of health insurance, an individual purchases health insurance to
insure against the loss of income they would suffer in order to pay for medical
care (Sloan and Hsieh, 2012). This model considers risk preferences with regards
to wealth, but not health. An individual purchases medical insurance to protect
against low probability, high cost events. The future cost of medical care is uncer-
tain because they do not know how sick they will be and, thus, how much medical
care they will need. Importantly, an individual does not purchase health insurance
because they care about health for its own sake. An individual’s willingness to
pay for health insurance depends on the curvature of their utility-wealth function
and their wealth in a ”sick” state (when they have to pay for medical care5) and a
”healthy” state (Sloan and Hsieh, 2012). This model assumes that utility is solely
dervied from wealth.










Figure 1 shows the utility function of an individual who is risk averse with regard
to wealth and health. Figure 2 shows the health-state dependent curves for the
demand of health insurance for individuals with risk averse preferences. When in-
dividuals have separate preferences regarding health, the marginal utility of wealth
depends on health.
We can use this model to test if an individual with no income risk aversion
5In this model, consumption of medical care is not a choice. Individuals will always consume
the appropriate medical care when they are sick.
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Figure 1: Distinct Health and Wealth Preferences
Axes: U = Utility, W = Wealth, H = Health.
Figure 2: Implications for Demand for Insurance
The utility functions of individuals with the same risk aversion with regard to
wealth and health, projected onto the wealth-utility plane. The level curves
represent the utility of individuals at varying levels of health. On the left,
αW = αH = .7. On the right, αW = αH = .3.
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but nonzero health risk aversion purchases health insurance. Figure 3 shows that
changing health risk preferences shift the utility-wealth curve, but do not intro-
duce nonlinearity, so an individual would not purchase health insurance under the
traditional model (See Figure ??). This result is dependent on the assumption that
health and wealth preferences are modelled as additively separable. Bommier and
Rochet (2006) demonstrate that relaxing the assumption of additive separability
has significant implications for risk preferences, so relaxing this assumption may
change the results. More work is needed to further develop these implications, as
they may help explain the rise in health spending (e.g., Hall and Jones, 2019).
Figure 3: Income Risk Neutral
The utility functions of individuals who are income risk neutral and health risk
averse, projected onto the wealth-utility plane. The level curves represent the
utility of individuals at varying levels of health. For both graphs, αW = 0. On
the left, αH = .7. On the right, αH = .3.
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4.2 Theory 2: Health-State Dependent Income Risk Pref-
erences
Even if an individual only cares about income, or only has risk preferences over






This assumption is compatible with a CRRA specification of the utility function,
because αW is still constant with respect to wealth. The findings from Dohmen
(2011), Sahm (2012), and Kettlewell (2019) reviewed in Section ?? are relevant
to this theory because the studies use measures of income risk preferences. The
relevance of the findings of Decker and Schmitz (2016) is unclear given that they
employ a measure of general risk preferences rather than income risk preferences.
Theory 2 is consistent with the psychology literature, which has identified two
potential mediators between health and financial risk preferences: stress and emo-
tions.
Health may impact risk preferences by changing stress levels. There is some
evidence that cortisol increases risk aversion in financial investments (Kandasamy,
2014). Stress heightens risk aversion by exacerbating loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner,
2016). However, Delaney et al. (2014) show that when time preferences are
included in the model, stress changes time preferences rather than risk preferences.
(See Sokol-Hessner, 2016 for a review.) Stress may be a particularly important
mediator for mental health shocks, since conditions such as depression and anxiety
change cortisol regulation.
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Emotions are another possible mechanism. Psychological studies using a va-
riety of methodologies have agreed that risk preferences are the product of some
deliberate consideration, rather than pure instinct. Since risk preferences are de-
pendent on self-regulation of emotion, strong negative emotions, which disrupt self-
regulation, also change risk preferences (Heilman et al., 2010; Leith and Baumeis-
ter, 1996; Martin and Delgado, 2011). Furthermore, personalities with high emo-
tional volatility (neuroticism) are more sensitive to stressors (Norris, 2007). Due to
data limitations, I am not able to test whether stress or emotions are mechanisms
for the health-risk preferences relationship.
An intertemporal extension of the model could imply health-state dependence
or lasting effects of health changes. In the case of health-state dependence, risk
preferences would change when an individual got sick, but then they would change
back when an individual returned to their original level of health. If health shocks
have lasting effects on risk aversion, an individual’s preferences would not necessar-
ily return to their original level. In this paper, I am not able to distinguish between
the two alternatives because the measure of risk preferences is only observed once
per participant.
In the following sections, I empirically test the health-state dependence of
income risk preferences. A statistically significant relationship between a health
shock and income risk preferences or health and income risk preferences is evidence
of health-state dependent income risk preferences.
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5 Data
I employ longitudinal data from the UNC Alumni Heart Study (UNCAHS) to
study the health-risk preference relationship. 8,466 UNC alumni (students in 1964
and 1965) and their spouses had the opportunity to participate in surveys from
1987-2013. Spouses joined the survey in 1992 (wave 5). The surveys were ad-
ministered every 12-24 months. The focus of the survey has been on health and
psychological traits. The 2013 wave included questions intended to elicit risk pref-
erences, time preferences, and subjective life expectations.
These data have never been applied to risk aversion research. Similar to
datasets that are commonly used (e.g., the Health and Retirement Study and
the German Socio-Economic Panel), the UNCAHS consists of panel data with ex-
tensive health information. Additionally, at the time risk preferences were elicited,
the average age of the UNCAHS sample was 65, which Harris and Kohn (2016)
have argued is a benefit because of the increased health heterogeneity of older
populations. The availability of time preferences is a strength of these data, as
Huffman et al. (2016) show that time preferences are relevant to decision-making
of elderly populations and health conditions.
The major limitation of the UNCAHS data is that the economic preferences
questions were asked only once, so I cannot observe potential changes in risk pref-
erences or control for past risk preferences. Also, the dataset includes limited
information on health insurance and medical care use (which are theoretically
important for explaining variation in health). Finally, the intervals between ques-
tionnaires, and the questions asked, vary across waves. For questions that vary
across waves, generalized, consistent measures are created.
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Table 1 shows the survey year, sample, and response rate over time. Of the
8,466 alumni participants sent the survey, 2,168 participants never responded, for
an overall response rate of 74%. Among those who participated at least once,
2,011 (24% of respondents) returned every survey. 4,287 (50%) missed at least one
survey. Of those that missed at least one wave, 72% responded to a future survey.
5.1 Sample Selection
The estimation sample is limited to respondents who answered the risk preference
question in questionnaire 13. As described in the following section, the 4 respon-
dents who were willing to pay a risk premium greater than the expected value
of the loss are excluded from my analysis. Since nonwhite participants consitute
only 0.005% of the remaining sample, I am not able to adequately control for the
effect of race, so I drop them from the sample. An important limitation of this
study is that the results may not be generalizable across racial groups. The results
also may not be generalizable across nationality. For instance, Weber and Blais
(2006) find significant, substantial differences in perceived risk between French and
American participants. Since the introduction of covariates significantly limits the
sample size, I created indicator variables for variables with missing values so I can
include all 1,507 participants.
Summary statistics of the estimation sample are shown in Table 3. The estima-
tion sample is statistically significantly more likely to be highly educated, female,
and older than the sample that received the survey. A limitation of the data is
that many of the variables have missing values. I assume that variables with less
than five percent missing are missing randomly. I test the strength of this assump-
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Table 1: Survey Responses Over Time
Wave Response Range Respondents Response Rate6
# Min Max N %
1 1986 2005 5127 61
2 1986 1994 4130 49
3 1989 1994 4309 51
4 1991 1994 4111 49
5 1992 1995 4792 57
6 1994 1997 4609 54
7 1997 2005 4166 49
8 1999 2004 5197 61
9 2001 2010 3777 45
10 2004 2010 4421 52
11 2006 2011 3750 44
12 2008 2014 4052 48
13 2011 2014 3248 38
6The denominator is those with the opportunity to respond to
the survey, 8,466. Before wave 5, spouses had not been
introduced, so the response rate was higher.
Table 2: Description of Estimation Sample
Sample Selection Number of participants
Criteria Sample Redaction Remaining Sample
Received Survey 8466
Responded to ≥ 1 surveys -2168 6298a
Risk Preference -4779 1520b
Premium ≤ $40,000 -4 1516
White Respondent -8 1508c
aFull sample
bEligible sample for risk preference analysis
cEstimation sample
26
tion by regressing each missing indicator on demographic variables with a logistic
regression with robust standard errors, for the sample that answered dependent
variable. The assumption is supported for a health shock, health, marital status,
and time preferences. Subjective life expectations are assumed to be missing ran-
domly conditional on age (older respondents are more likely to have skipped the
question). I address the potential endogeneity of missing income in Section 6.1.4.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Raw Risk Preferences 1508 12449.56 4894.18 0 40000
Any Health Shock 1433 .19 .39 0 1
Any Health Shock Missing 1508 .05 .22 0 1
Current Health Status
Excellent 1489 .38 .49 0 1
Fair/Poor 1489 .09 .28 0 1
Missing 1508 .01 .11 0 1
Age at Q13 1507 64.93 2.71 47 87
Female 1507 .36 .48 0 1
Education (years) 1507 17.62 2.19 12 21
Family Income/1000 1324 158.14 132.35 5 500
Family Income Missing 1508 .12 .33 0 1
Martial Status at Q12
Separated 1431 .1 .3 0 1
Widowed 1431 .02 .14 0 1
Single 1431 .04 .19 0 1
Missing 1508 .05 .22 0 1
Time Preference7
Probability 1487 48.23 28.26 0 100
Missing 1508 .01 .12 0 1
Subjective Life Expectations8
Probability 1488 65.02 26.44 0 100
Missing 1508 .01 .11 0 1
7Lowest probability p at which participant would take a medication that would prolong their
life 30 years with probability p and cause them to die suddenly with probability 1-p instead of
living 20 years with certainty. A higher probability indicates higher present-bias.
8The probability that participants ”feel” they will live 20 more years.
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5.2 Risk Preferences
Risk preferences are measured via an experimental gamble question designed to
elicit willingness to pay for health insurance9. The question asks respondents to
consider a hypothetical situation in which they have $100,000 in income (Y ) and
face a 30 percent probability of getting sick (psick) and needing to pay $40,000 in
medical costs (L). The expected value of the financial loss,
E[L] = psick ∗ L+ (1− psick) ∗ 0, (14)
is the actuarially fair price of health insurance. In this case, the actuarially fair
price is $12,000. However, given that individuals may have non-neutral risk pref-
erences, individuals may be willing to pay more or less than the expected loss to
avoid the risk. Let x by the price an individual is willing to pay for health insur-
ance. An individual’s health insurance decision can be represented as: choose a
value of x such that
1 ∗ u(Y − x) ≥ psick ∗ u(Y − L) + (1− psick) ∗ u(Y ).10 (15)
Those who are willing to pay the actuarially fair price are risk neutral, while
those who would pay more are risk averse and those who would pay less are risk
loving.
Risk preferences were solicited with a multiple choice question and a free-
9Einav et al (2012) finds that individuals exhibit distinct income risk preferences in decisions
related to insurance versus 401(k), so this measurement may not be representative of general
income risk preferences.
10This model of the expected value of insurance is a simplified model (compared to Harrison
(2016)) that does not consider the risk of the insurer failing to pay for a loss and assumes that
the insurer pays for the full loss.
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response question, which allows for two measurements of risk preferences. In the
multiple choice question, a respondent’s maximum willingness to pay is represented
by the dollar amount at which they “switch” from accepting an insurance premium
to rejecting a higher premium. However, given the discrete premium options, it
is not possible to identify the exact premium at which an individual switches, so
only intervals of risk preferences can be determined. For instance, if an individual
is willing to pay $12,150, but not $12,300, their maximum willingness to pay is
$12,150 ≤ x < $12,300. This method follows Cassar et al. (2017), Harrison and
Ng (2016), Dave (2010), and Sam (2012). For empirical use, I assign individuals a
premium, x, equal to the midpoint of the chosen interval. Of the 1520 respondents
who answered the risk preference questions, 58 answered “no” to at least one of
the multiple choice questions, but provided no additional information. I assume
that they are only willing to pay less than the lowest alternative and assign them
$11,750.
The free response question allows us to pinpoint an individual’s risk preference
because the individual specifies their own maximum, rather than choosing between
the limited set of options provided in the multiple choice question. This feature
is a key advantage of our data compared to the datasets used in the literature,
and it allows us to estimate individual risk preferences more accurately. For my
first dependent variable, raw risk preferences, I use midpoint estimates from the
multiple choice answers when there is no free response answer (138 cases). I prefer
the multiple choice answer when the lowest end of the multiple choice interval
is greater than the free response answer, so the variable represents respondent’s
maximum stated willingness to pay.
The distribution of the raw risk preference is shown in Figure 4. Responses
29
Figure 4: Distribution of Raw Risk Preferences
are clustered around the actuarially fair price, but responses range from $0 to
$90,000. The concentration around the actuarially fair premium may be a result
of the question design. The preamble to the question explained to respondents that
the expected value of the loss was $12,000. This phrasing controlled for variation in
mathematical knowledge and ability to calculate the expected value on one’s own,
but may have anchored participants to $12,000 and caused them to list a value
closer to $12,000 than they otherwise would have. Additionally, the multiple choice
questions were asked before the free response question, and only options ranging
from $11,900 to $13,000 were provided, which may have suggested to participants
what was a “reasonable” or “good” answer. The variance of risk preferences is a
significant finding in itself. The multiple choice questions commonly used in the
literature do not allow participants to show such a diversity of risk preferences.
However, the free response questions do allow individuals to show more irra-
tionality. Some participants (4) were willing to pay more ($50,000-$90,000) than
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the given cost of prospective medical care ($40,000), which would entail a net loss
in all situations and only makes sense if the participants enjoy health insurance
for its own sake. Other participants (19) gave alternating answers on the multiple
choice questions that violate the transitive property. Another 132 participants
wrote in a premium that was inconsistent with their multiple choice answers. I
consider these (155) responses inconsistent. Individuals who gave inconsistent re-
sponses are statistically significantly more likely to be older, female, have a mental
health condition, have less family income, and are less likely to be in excellent
health (two-tailed t-tests). However, due to the relatively small sample, no strong
inferences can be made. I retain these inconsistent responses in the estimation
sample, but drop those willing to pay more than $40,000 due to their leverage.
Dave et al. (2010) finds that complex risk preference eliciation questions respon-
dents generate “noisier behavior” but are more accurate.
5.3 Health Shocks
The UNCAHS dataset includes three measures of health shocks commonly used
in the health economics literature: change in self-reported health status, onset
of a severe condition, and self-reported health shocks. A change in self-reported
health status is defined as a health shock if health status in one period declines
from excellent or good to fair or poor in the next period (following Decker and
Schmitz, 2016). Given that there was more than a year between questionnaires
and the self-reported health status question was only asked in waves 10, 12, and
13, this measure includes a 2-4 year lag. The severe conditions considered as
health shocks are the onset of a heart attack, coronary artery disease, cancer,
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stroke, alzheimers, diabetes, or having had a cardiac catheterization or coronary
procedure. The onset of a condition is defined as the first time a participant
reported the condition. Since no new participants joined the survey in wave 13
and data on severe conditions of all participants are available for every wave,
this definition should accurately capture recent health shocks. The self-reported
health shock responses are taken from the Traumatic Life Events Questionaire, in
which participants had the opportunity to identify “a life threatening illness” as a
traumatic event they experienced. I use a combined measure in estimation. As a
robustness check, I test if results are robust to differing measures of health shocks
in Section 8.1.
Remarkably, correlations between health shock measures are low, ranging from
-0.03 to 0.16. This finding is supported by Decker and Schmitz (2016), who found
that health shock measures were complementary. The self-reported health shock
measure is relatively highly correlated with both of the other health measures in
Q13.
I test whether health shocks are assigned randomly with a logistic regression
with robust standard errors. When the health shock treatment is regressed on
demographic variables and a health measure, only gender is significant. Women
in the sample are less likely to experience a health shock, which is consistent with
common knowledge that men’s health declines faster than women’s health, given
that most of the sample is the same age. Therefore, I assume that health shocks
are assigned randomly conditional on gender.
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6 Empirical Framework
In this section, I develop an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for
estimating risk preferences. I use two stage least squares (2SLS) regression to test
the endogeneity of health and income to the model. I use this model to estimate
raw risk preferences to test the assumption of constant relative risk aversion with
respect to income in Section 7.1. After I calculate individual’s elicited risk prefer-
ences in Section 7.2, I use this model with elicited risk preferences to examine the
relationship between health and income risk preferences (Theory 2 ).
This paper examines the health-risk preference relationship, where
αWi = Γ(Hi, H
s
i , Yi, Xi, βi, δi). (16)
where the dependent variable, αW , is a measure of risk preferences, Hi is the
health stock brought into the current wave (i.e., most recent recorded health), Hsi
is whether the respodent experienced a health shock in the previous period, Yit
is family income, and Xi is a vector of time-invariant individual characteristics.
Subjective expectations for survival are represented by δi and time preferences by
βi. This model is visualized in Figure 5.
I control for variables that theoretically impact both an individual’s likelihood
of having a health shock and their risk preferences in the inital OLS model. How-
ever, physical and mental health and family income are endogenous choice variables
and are likely dependent on past risk preferences. Martial status and education
are also endogenous variables, but are assumed to be exogenous given the average
life stage of the sample.
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Figure 5: Model I
The number in parentheses indicates the survey wave.
The directional relationship between health and risk aversion is not well estab-
lished and there is potential for reverse causality (Schildberg-Hörsich 2018). Past
risk preferences could have impacted current health status and/or the likelihood
of experiencing a health shock through a mediator such as purchase of insurance,
income, or use of medical care. A limitation of this study is that I do not have a
measure of past risk preferences.
Preliminary OLS results demonstrate substantial heteroskedasticity in the model,
so I employ robust standard errors.
6.1 Instrumental Variables
Since health status and income are theoretically endogenous, I use an instrumental
variables approach to test whether the variables are endogenous in Equation 16.
The estimated marginal effect of income and self-reported health status in the OLS
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model will be inconsistent if income and/or health is correlated with the error term.
For instance, individuals with higher risk aversion in the previous period may be
both more likely to be in excellent health (if they invest more in health-producing
behaviors) and more likely to have higher risk aversion than those with more risk
tolerance in the past. In this case, OLS would over-state the effect of health.
In order to create an unbiased OLS estimate, I need to isolate the effects of
health and income that are uncorrelated with the error term. A two-stage least
squares model does this by first estimating an endogenous variable, for instance,
health, as




i + γ4Yi + γ5Xi + γ6βi + γ7δi + εi,j, (17)
where Zi,j is a vector of instrumental variables that are relevent to health and inde-
pendent of the error term in the risk preferences estimation and index j represents
individuals’ communities.11 Then, the predicted values of health are substituted
into the model as the second stage of estimation (Equation 16). The covariates
from the second stage are included in the first stage as well in order to reduce
omitted variable bias.
In order to use instrumental variables for health and income, which have indi-
cators to represent missing values, I assume that health and income are missing
randomly, and therefore the missing indicators are exogenous. Supplementary Ta-
ble 14 tests these assumptions with a probit model estimating whether health or
income, respectively, were missing in wave 13. The results support the assumption
that health status is missing randomly, but provide weak evidence that income
11This distinction is necessary because some instrumental variables are on the community level,
defined as the areas with the same first three numbers as an individual’s zip code.
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is assigned randomly. Therefore, I use a second, adapted two stage least squares
method to test the endogeneity of income, which is explained in Section 6.1.4 and
corroborates the results of the first method.
6.1.1 Instrumenting Health
I employ two instrumental variables to instrument health: the number of federally-
qualified health centers in the participant’s 3-digit zip code region at the time
the 13th wave of the survey was sent out and the individual’s exercise habits
ten years prior. The number of health centers is a proxy for the accessibility of
health services to the individual, and the price of medical care in their community.
Broadly, the more health centers, the easier it should be for an individual to access
services and the lower the price of medical care. Under the assumption that an
individual’s location is exogenous, this instrument is exogenous. The Health and
Resources Service Administration (HRSA) provides publically available data on
the number of federally-qualified health centers at the census tract level (Health
and Resources). The Census Bureau’s 2010 crosswalk was used to convert between
census tract and zip codes. A few (79) participants do not have zip code data,
so a missing indicator is included. Individual’s exercise habits were surveyed in
wave 9 of UNCAHS on a scale of 0-7 that took into account the average intensity
and duration of their activities. I assume that exercise habits have no impact on
future risk preferences, except through health, though past risk preferences may
have influenced how much an individual chooses to exercise.
The results of Table 4 provide evidence that both instruments are strong. An
ideal instrument is highly correlated with the potentially endogenous variable and
uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regression. Column 1 is
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Table 4: Relevance and Independence of Health Instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Health Raw Risk Raw Risk
Local Health Centers 0.00220∗∗ -3.618
(0.00109) (10.73)
Local Health Centers (M) -0.271∗∗∗ 284.0
(0.0564) (875.2)
Exercise Habits t-10 0.0467∗∗∗ 68.22
(0.00547) (127.8)




Health t (M) -5171.6 -1104.6
(8211.6) (4509.9)
Observations 2768 1507 1507
R2 0.252 0.011 0.026
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
an OLS regression of Equation 17. The marginal effects of both instruments are
statistically significant, showing that they are highly correlated with health. As
expected, both more health centers and more exercise have a positive association
with health status. Ten additional health centers or a change from avoiding physi-
cal activity to running ten miles a week is associated with two-thirds of a standard
deviation increase in health. Ideally, I could demonstrate the independence of the
instruments from the error term in the risk preference equation. An instrument
could be considered independent if its marginal effect on risk preferences was in-
distinguishable from zero. However, this test would not give the true marginal
effects, as they would be correlated with health, which may be endogenous, and
therefore inconsistent. To avoid this scenario, I employ two stage least squares re-
gressions in which one potential instrument was used to correct for the endogeneity
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in health in the first stage while the other was included as a covariate in the second
stage. In this case, the coefficient on the instrument included as a covariate in the
regression will be consistent conditional on the assumption that the instrument
used in the first stage is valid. For the two stage least squares regression in col-
umn 3, the number of health centers is used to instrument for health and has an
F-statistic of 9.5. In the column 4 regression, former exercise habits are used to
instrument for health, and instrument has an F-statistic of 18.5. These results
support the assumption that they are valid. In both cases, the included variable
is not statistically significant from zero, suggesting that they are independent.
6.1.2 Instrumenting Income
I instrument family income with two variables: the number of manufacturing jobs
in the participant’s 3-digit zip code when the 13th wave of the survey was sent out
and whether an individual could afford adequate medical care 18 years ago. The
number of manufacturing jobs is a proxy for the health of the local economy and
is exogenous under the same assumption that location is exogenous. The data is
from the Census: County Business Patterns and was access through PolicyMap
(Census). The data whether an individual could afford medical care come from
wave 5 of UNCAHS. Individuals were asked ”How adequate are your resources
(your income, your insurance or health plan) in providing the level of care you feel
you need?” and given a scale from 1 ”Very adequate” to 4 ”Not at all adequate”. I
construct an indicator for whether or not an individual responded ”Very adequate”
and use that indicator and a missing indicator for the variable as instruments.
Observations on this variable are only missing for 5 percent of the estimation
sample, and appear to be missing randomly.
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Table 5: Relevance and Independence of Income Instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Family Income Raw Risk Raw Risk
Local Manufacturing Jobs -1.451∗∗∗ 10.38
(0.363) (17.79)
Local Manufacturing Jobs (M) -37.59∗∗∗ 479.4
(12.57) (856.2)
Could Afford Medical Care t-18 64.46∗∗∗ 558.7
(4.983) (792.9)
Could Afford Medical Care (M) 44.29∗∗∗ 223.2
(10.70) (1023.7)
Family Income -1.389 7.640
(12.41) (4.974)
Family Income (M) 415.7 1807.8∗∗
(1958.5) (855.3)
Observations 1977 1507 1507
R2 0.149 0.019 0.012
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5 displays evidence that the instruments are strong in the same format
as Table 4. In the first stage regression in column 1, both instruments are signif-
icant. Contrary to expectation, the number of manufacturing jobs has an inverse
relationship with family income. In columns 2 and 3, the instruments are insignif-
icant, demonstrating their independence. F-statistics of the instruments uses to
instrument income in columns 3 and 4 are 6.24 and 65.33, respectively, so this
strong evidence for the independence of the income instruments.
6.1.3 Testing for Endogeneity
The estimates of the OLS model may be biased due to the endogeneity of health
and income. In this section, I use two-stage least squares regression to empirically
test whether health and income are endogenous and need to be instrumented.
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Table 6, column 2 shows the results of a two stage least squares regression
that controls for the endogeneity of health. The instruments for health are jointly
statistically significant in the first stage, with an F-statistic of 14.86. A test of
overidentifying restrictions is highly insignificant (p=.62) so we fail to reject the
null hypothesis of overidentification. These results confirm that the two instru-
ments are strong. However, Woodridge’s test fails to reject the null hypothesis
(p=0.99) that the error terms between the first and second stage regressions are
uncorrelated. This result implies that health is not endogenous to the model. The
results in column 2 show that the coefficient on health is almost the same size in
both the OLS and 2SLS models, suggesting that the coefficient in the OLS model
is unbiased. Column 1 shows the results of an OLS regression of Equation 16, for
comparison.
Column 3 shows the results of a two stage least squares regression that accounts
for the endogeneity of income. The instruments for income used for column 3 are
also jointly statistically significant in the first stage, with an F-statistic of 35.77,
and the the model is overidentified (p=0.82). Again, Woolridge’s test fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the error terms of the two stages are uncorrelated (p=.41).
The OLS and 2SLS coefficients on income are similar sizes, supporting the result
of Woolridge’s test. Interestingly, when income is instrumented, the effect of a
health shock becomes statistically significant and larger.
6.1.4 Secondary Method
Given the evidence in Supplementary Table 14 that missing income is endogenous,
I employ a second, manual adaptation of an instrumental variables model to test
the robustness of my findings. I estimate family income in a first stage regression
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Table 6: Instrumental Variable Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Raw Risk Raw Risk Raw Risk
Any Health Shock 540.6 (408.6) 620.7 (637.7) 765.6∗∗ (383.6)
Any Health Shock (M) 624.8 (777.8) 706.6 (809.5) 803.4 (790.1)
Health -471.2∗ (252.2) -743.2 (1233.8) -484.4∗∗ (230.3)
Health t (M) -1556.7 (1395.6) -2411.3 (4093.9) -1487.6 (1354.9)
Family Income 3.730∗∗ (1.798) 2.665∗∗ (1.249) 6.095 (4.459)
Family Income (M) 1111.8∗∗ (436.2) 1076.9∗∗∗ (415.6) 1578.5∗∗ (787.9)
Age -23.06 (39.86) -22.21 (39.20) -11.17 (41.32)
Female -13.76 (289.6) 161.1 (302.9) 293.5 (299.5)
Education 38.95 (69.13) 68.15 (66.65) 25.38 (74.59)
Separated -700.0∗ (370.3) -659.0∗ (372.9) -475.1 (409.3)
Widowed -348.7 (1017.3) -249.7 (1029.3) -151.0 (1033.8)
Single -1078.1 (826.2) -1037.5 (849.8) -678.8 (942.3)
Marital Status (M) -1051.0 (647.0) -1008.1 (659.5) -967.0 (672.4)
Risky Med Prob 13.85∗∗∗ (4.885) 14.88∗∗∗ (4.593) 15.29∗∗∗ (4.615)
Risky Med Prob (M) 409.8 (786.0) 506.2 (787.9) 615.5 (788.8)
Prob Live 20y -1.659 (5.794) 2.141 (11.83) -1.365 (5.487)
Prob Live 20y (M) -1523.9 (931.8) -1256.9 (1090.6) -1556.5∗ (900.0)
Constant 13794.4∗∗∗ (3010.1) 13745.0∗∗∗ (4131.0) 12489.0∗∗∗ (2847.4)
Observations 1519 1507 1507
R2 0.021 0.025 0.019
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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with local manufacturing jobs and local median income as instruments. The local
median income data is from the Census, the year the 13th wave of the survey was
sent out (Census 2011). The instruments are jointly significant, with an F-statistic
of 49. I use this model to predict family income for all observations in the sample,
so there are no missing values. In the second stage, I use these predicted values,
and bootstrap the standard errors to correct them. The error terms of the first
and second stage regressions are not highly correlated (.0745) and the results are
similar to the previous model (see Supplementary Table 15 and column 3 of Table
6), corroborating the evidence that income is exogenous to this model.
Given that the endogeneity tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity
for both health and income and that the marginal effects of health and income do
not substantially change between the OLS and 2SLS regressions, I assume that
health and income happen to be exogenous in this model. For the remainder of
the paper, I do not use instrumental variables. This result allows me to include
nonlinear terms for health and income in the model, which is a key method to test
my hypothesis and not possible in a two stage least squares regression.
An OLS regression of Equation 16 is used to test the assumption of constant
relative risk aversion with respect to income in the following section and then the
effect of a health shock on elicited income risk preference (Theory 2 ) in Section 8.
7 Eliciting Risk Preferences
To directly compare respondent’s risk preferences to the literature, I elicit relative
risk parameters from the premium responses. In order to elicit risk preferences from
gamble responses, one has to assume a functional form of the utility function. It is
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standard practice to assume a functional form that specifies constant relative risk
aversion with respect to income. In the section that follows, I test the strength of
that assumption before eliciting risk preferences from gamble responses.
7.1 Testing the Constant Relative Risk Aversion Assump-
tion with Raw Risk Preferences
First, I test the assumption of constant relative risk aversion with respect to income
frequently employed in the literature. A respondent’s willingness to pay for health
insurance approximates their absolute risk aversion. The marginal effect of income
on relative risk aversion can be approximated with non-linear terms. For instance,
the effect of a quadratic term for income can be understood as ”the marginal effect
of income of risk preferences, relative to one’s level of income”. Given the definition
of relative risk aversion from Equation 2 and the constant relative risk aversion
specification of the utility function from Equation 3, ∂RRA
∂w
= α = 0. If the CRRA
assumption is true, the marginal effect of non-linear terms for income or health on
risk preferences not be statistically significantly different from zero. A significant
nonlinear relationship between income and risk preferences is evidence to reject
the null hypothesis of constant relative risk aversion with respect to income.
To test this assumption, I estimate respondent’s willingness to pay for health
insurance with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Additional higher
order terms and interactions are included when theoretically relevant and when
significant. The benefit of this parametric model is that the marginal effects of
income will be easily interpretable. The drawback is that the relationship between
relative risk aversion and income is not specified to be linear. Equation 2 may be
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highly nonlinear, and ∂RRA
∂w
may be non-linear if the CRRA assumption does not
hold. With an OLS regression, I can specify nonlinear terms, but the dependent
variable is assumed to be a linear function of the covariates. Thus, this model will
provide useful evidence as to whether or not the CRRA assumption holds, but will
not necessarily provide a correct estimate for the effect of health or income on risk
preferences if the marginal effect is nonzero.
Table 7: Constant Relative Risk Aversion Assumption
(1) (2)
Raw Risk Raw Risk
Health -450.8∗∗ 15409.5∗∗
(219.2) (7073.5)










Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7 displays the coefficients on health and income from an OLS regres-
sion explaining variation in raw risk preferences. (See the full set of results in
Supplementary Table 13). Column 1 shows the results of a linear regression. Col-
umn 2 includes theoretically-relevant higher order and interaction terms and those
that are statistically significant. There is a linear relationship between raw risk
preferences and family income. No higher order terms are significant, nor is a
log transformation of income. However, the relationship between income and risk
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preferences is heterogenous across individuals with different education: the risk
preferences of those that are more educated are less responsive to changes in in-
come. With these findings, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of constant relative
risk aversion with respect to income. Given this evidence, I procede to use the
CRRA assumption to elicit risk preferences in order to have comprable results to
the existing literature.
7.2 Eliciting Risk Preferences
In this section, I use the dollar amount that respondents were willing to pay for
health insurance (raw risk preferences) and the parameters of the risk preferences
question to calculate each individual’s relative income risk aversion, αW .





, ρ 6= 1 (18)
where ρ represents an individual’s risk preferences, then an individual will be
willing to pay a premium that satisfies










The maximum premium that an individual will be willing to pay to insure a given
risk will satisfy











Given the parameters of the question, respondents faced the problem:
1 ∗ (100000− x)
1−ρ
1− ρ
= .3 ∗ (60000)
1−ρ
1− ρ




We can solve for ρ to get the interval estimates displayed in Table 8. Using
the free response data, we can calculate point estimates of ρ. I call these values
elicited risk preferences. Figure 6 visualizes the transformation from raw to elicited
risk preferences. The relationship is linear due to the assumed functional form.
However, given the assumed CRRA specification of the utility function, Equation
21 can only be approximated when $11,000 ≤ ρ < $15,060. Figure 6 marks in
green which observations in the distribution of risk preferences were able to be
transformed in to a relative risk parameter. Presumably, past studies have not
encountered this issue with the CRRA functional form because they have not
allowed such diverse risk preferences.
Table 8: Elicited Risk Preferences: Multiple Choice
Maximum Premium Interval
11900 -0.05 ≤ ρ < 0.00
12000 0.00 ≤ ρ < 0.02
12050 0.02 ≤ ρ < 0.07
12150 0.07 ≤ ρ < 0.14
12300 0.14 ≤ ρ < 0.24
12500 0.24 ≤ ρ < 0.47
13000 0.47 ≤ ρ
I use point estimates elicted from the raw risk preference variable as the main
dependent variable, elicited risk preferences. Summary statistics comparing raw
and elicited risk preferences are displayed in Table 9. Positive values of elicited
risk preferences indicate risk averse preferences, negative values indicate risk-loving
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Figure 6: Comparing Distributions of Raw and Elicited Risk Preferences
preferences, and ρ = 0 indicates risk neutral preferences. Table 10 shows a sample
of elicited risk aversion estimates from the literature. All studies included assume
a CRRA utility function. Our findings fall within a reasonable range.
Table 9: Summary Statistics of Raw and Elicited Risk Preferences
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Elicited Risk Preferences 1165 .447 .506 -1.062 1.356
Raw Risk Preferences 1507 12450.52 4895.666 0 40000
Table 10: Elicited Risk Preferences in the Literature
Citation Model Interval
Kimball et al. (2008) 0 < ρ < 3.27
Dave et al. (2010) Eckel-Grossman 0 < ρ < 3.46
Dave et al. (2010) Holt-Laury -1.71 < ρ < 1.37
Harrison and Ng (2016) .3 < ρ < 0.70
Phelps (2019) .8 < ρ < 3.00
A potential limitation to this method of eliciting risk preferences is that indi-
viduals may have answered the risk preference questions relative to their current
income instead of relative to the hypothetical income of $100,000. Theoretically,
we would expect risk aversion to decrease with income, given a concave speci-
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fication of the utility function. However, an intital OLS regression on raw risk
preferences (see Table 6 Column 1) indicates a significant, positive coefficient on
income. Future studies may use individual’s incomes in the elicitation of relative
risk parameters to test the robustness of their results.
The elicted risk parameters can be used to model respondent’s utility functions.
Given our assumption of a CRRA specification of the utility function and the
assumption of the basic insurance model that individuals pay for health insurance
to insure against an income loss, the elicited risk values give the curvature of the
individual’s utility function with respect to income. Figure 7 shows the most risk-
averse (light color) and most risk-loving (dark color) respondent from the multiple
choice question (blue) and free response question (red).
Figure 7: Range of Utility Functions
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I test the endogeneity of health status and income in a regression of Equation
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16 on elicited risk preferences using the methods employed in Section 6.1. The
results suggest that health and income are exogenous to the model, so I do not
use instrumental variables. See Supplementary Tables 16 - 18 for detailed results.
Note that for estimation of elicited risk preferences, instrumenting income does
not make the effect of a health shock and health significant.
Note that, due to the limited range of raw risk values for which I was able to
calculate a relative risk parameter, the estimation sample is further reduced to
1,165 observations. However, the sample is not statistically significantly distinct
from the raw risk preferences estimation sample. (See Supplementary Table 20 for
detailed summary statistics.)
8 Results
With elicited risk preferences, I can directly estimate the relationship between
health and relative risk aversion. Table 11 column 1 shows the results of an OLS
regression of Equation 16 with only linear terms. Column 2 shows the results of
an OLS regression with statistically significant higher order terms and interactions
included. The table displays the coefficients on each term, and here I report the
marginal effects. Experiencing a health shock does not have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the risk preferences of all respondents: the effect depends on one’s
education. Figure 8 shows that the mean effect of a health shock is only statisti-
cally significantly different from zero for those that have attended graduate school
(22% of the sample). For those with a graduate degree, experiencing a health
shock increases their relative risk aversion by .15 (p=.026), or 30% of a standard
deviation. These results provide some evidence that income risk preferences may
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be health-state dependent, and that income moderates this effect. However, the
regression explains only 3% of the variation in risk preferences, which suggests
that health is not highly relevant for explaining risk preferences.
Table 11: Health State Dependence of Income Risk Preferences
(1) (2)
Elicited Risk Elicited Risk
Any Health Shock 0.0525 (0.0394) -0.445 (0.302)
Any Health Shock (M) 0.0103 (0.0893) 0.00976 (0.0885)
Age -0.0158∗∗∗ (0.00519) -0.0149∗∗∗ (0.00517)
Female -0.0237 (0.0313) -0.0143 (0.0314)
Education 0.0119∗ (0.00684) 0.00824 (0.00740)
Family Income 0.000203 (0.000134) 0.000178 (0.000133)
Family Income (M) -0.0192 (0.0500) -0.0301 (0.0504)
Separated -0.0184 (0.0484) -0.0147 (0.0477)
Widowed -0.0859 (0.111) -0.0976 (0.112)
Single 0.151 (0.105) 0.156 (0.105)
Marital Status (M) -0.0210 (0.0950) -0.0112 (0.0950)
Risky Med Prob -0.000558 (0.000515) 0.00417∗∗ (0.00186)
Risky Med Prob (M) 0.0858 (0.126) 0.150 (0.130)
Prob Live 20y -0.000440 (0.000623) -0.000450 (0.000620)
Prob Live 20y (M) -0.298∗∗∗ (0.103) -0.271∗∗∗ (0.104)
Risky Med Prob² -0.0000494∗∗∗ (0.0000179)
Health Shock x Education 0.0283∗ (0.0170)
Constant 1.294∗∗∗ (0.350) 1.229∗∗∗ (0.354)
Observations 1165 1165
R2 0.025 0.032
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Age and time preferences are statistically significant predictors of risk prefer-
ences. Older individuals are more risk-loving.13 Figure 9 shows that, on average,
the oldest respondents are only slightly risk averse, while the youngest respondents
are most risk averse. This may be due to subjective life expectations changing with
13Note that the mean age of the sample is 64, so older individuals means those aged 65-87.
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Figure 8: Marginal Effect of a Health Shock, by Years of Education
age. Time preferences have a quadratic relationship with risk preferences, though
the curvature is slight. Figure 9 shows that those who value the future the most
and those who discount the future the most are more risk-loving. All of these
relationships indicate that risk aversion decreases at the end of one’s life, probably
due to changes in expectations for the future. A future study may employ joint
estimation to illustrate the relationships between time preferences, expectations,
and risk preferences.
Figure 9: Marginal Effects of Time Preferences and Age
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8.1 Robustness to Health Measurement
In this section, I examine the sensitivity of the primary result, the effect of a
health shock on risk preferences, to measurement of health shocks. I estimate
elicited risk preferences using the onset of a severe condition, the health shock
reported in the traumatic events questionaire, and the decline in self-reported
health status. (In previous estimations, I use a composite measure.) Using each
health shock measure, I re-estimate the model and allow for higher order terms and
interactions, as described earlier in Section 8. No interactions with any measures
of health shocks are significant. Table 12 shows all coefficients on health shocks,
health, income, and on coefficients that were statistically significant in Table 11,
for brevity.
Alternative health measures have different effects. None of the alternative
health measures have a statistically significant effect on elicited risk preferences.
The sign of the marginal effect differs for men (though not for women): the onset
of a severe condition is associated with higher risk aversion, while a self-reported
health shock and decline in self-reported health status is associated with risk-loving
preferences. Decker and Schmitz (2016) also find that the effect of a health shock
on risk preferences is not robust to measurement, and conclude that this is due
to the complexity of health: each measurement only captures one aspect of an
individual’s health.
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Table 12: Robustness to Health Measures
(1) (2) (3)
Elicited Risk Elicited Risk Elicited Risk
Condition Onset 0.0766
(0.0544)
Reported Health Shock -0.0137
(0.0778)
Drop in SRHS -0.00143
(0.0769)
Health -0.0299 -0.0320 -0.0319
(0.0254) (0.0258) (0.0277)
Age -0.0150∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗
(0.00517) (0.00520) (0.00518)
Education 0.0134∗ 0.0143∗∗ 0.0136∗∗
(0.00690) (0.00687) (0.00691)
Family Income 0.000185 0.000185 0.000189
(0.000134) (0.000132) (0.000133)
Separated -0.0123 -0.0126 -0.0125
(0.0476) (0.0480) (0.0479)
Widowed -0.0901 -0.0862 -0.0854
(0.112) (0.110) (0.110)
Single 0.157 0.155 0.156
(0.105) (0.106) (0.106)
Risky Med Prob 0.00398∗∗ 0.00413∗∗ 0.00409∗∗
(0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00187)
Risky Med Prob² -0.0000482∗∗∗ -0.0000490∗∗∗ -0.0000491∗∗∗
(0.0000180) (0.0000180) (0.0000180)
Health Shock x Female -0.161∗
(0.0926)
Observations 1165 1165 1165
R2 0.033 0.032 0.030
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, I developed two potential theoretical relationships between health
and risk preferences. Though I could not empirically evaluate Theory 1, I find evi-
dence in the literature that individuals have risk preferences with regard to health
that are distinct from their risk preferences with regard to income. Additional
research is needed to develop the implications of this finding for models of demand
for health insurance.
I evaluated Theory 2 with an ordinary least squares model, and found that
income risk preferences are health-state dependent for individuals with a graduate
degree. A heterogenous effect across education is not surprising given the persistent
strong relationship between health and education (Grossman 2015). However, this
direction of the effect is not consistent with Dohmen et al. (2010), which finds
that individuals with higher cognitive abilities are less risk-averse. Given the
assumption that health shocks are assigned randomly, conditional on gender, and
that income and health status are exogenous, this effect can be interpreted as
causal. In all models, individuals that experience a health shock are more risk
averse. The direction of the health-risk preference relationship is consistent with
Sahm (2012), Decker and Schmitz (2016), and Kettlewell (2019). Together, these
studies provide conclusive evidence that health has an inverse relationship with
risk aversion.
However, there is not strong evidence that health is highly relevant to relative
risk aversion. The marginal effect of a health shock is only 30% of a standard de-
viation for one-fifth of the sample, and the models explain only 4% of the variation
in risk preferences. This finding is consistent with Sahm (2012)’s conclusion that
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health is not relevant to risk preferences.
I find evidence that the relevance of health is sensitive to measurement of
risk preferences. The linear effects of a health shock and health status are both
significant in the two stage least squares regression of raw risk preferences instru-
menting for predicted values of income. In this model, a experiencing a health
shock increases risk aversion by 16% of a standard deviation. This size of the
effect is remarkably similar to that found by Decker and Schmitz (2016) (11% of
a standard deviation). This finding may suggest that the effect found by Decker
and Schmitz is not robust to risk reference measurement and does not apply to
relative risk aversion. However, Schildberg-Hörisch (2018) finds that the general
willingness measure that Decker and Schmitz used is the best predictor of risky be-
haviors. Since the measurement of risk preferences substantially impacts results,
future studies may explore eliciting risk preferences with alternative functional
forms of individual’s utility functions. I find evidence to support the assumption
of constant relative risk aversion with respect to income, but the focus on one
functional form without substantial exploration of alternatives may be limiting
the literature.
All studies of the health-risk preference relationship thus far have only studied
the mean effect of risk preferences. Health may have more complex relationship
with risk preferences that is obscured by the assumption of a linear functional
form. A more flexible parametric model, such as the conditional density estimator
(Gilleskie 2004), would allow the effect of the covariates to vary over the distribu-
tion of risk preferences and allow a non-linear relationship between the dependent
variable and the covariates, while still permitting inference. Figure 10 displays
empirical evidence that the effect of a health shock and health vary over the dis-
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Figure 10: Evidence of a Nonlinear Health-Risk Preference Relationship
trubution of risk preferences. There is also a theoretical reason to think that health
has a nonlinear relationship with risk preferences: relative risk aversion, as defined
in Equation 2, is unlikely to have a linear functional form.
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11 Appendix
Table 13: Constant Relative Risk Aversion Assumption
(1) (2)
Raw Risk Raw Risk
Any Health Shock 755.5∗ 604.7
(385.7) (379.0)













Family Income 2.605∗∗ 21.74∗∗∗
(1.213) (8.259)








Marital Status (M) -1019.6 -918.9
(661.2) (686.1)
Risky Med Prob 14.98∗∗∗ 84.17∗∗∗
(4.570) (16.01)
Risky Med Prob (M) 537.5 1520.7∗
(769.8) (810.7)
Prob Live 20y -0.415 51.11∗∗
(5.427) (21.17)

















Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Can Afford Medical Care -0.0407 (0.0401)










Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Any Health Shock 739.0∗ (434.2)
Any Health Shock (M) 838.8 (920.5)
Health -548.4∗∗ (236.9)







Marital Status (M) -995.8 (711.9)
Risky Med Prob 15.12∗∗∗ (4.825)
Risky Med Prob (M) 659.5 (845.4)
Prob Live 20y -1.316 (5.428)
Prob Live 20y (M) -1236.8 (933.7)




Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Relevance and Independence of Instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Health Elicited Risk Elicited Risk
Local Health Centers 0.00220∗∗ -0.00197
(0.00109) (0.00123)
Local Health Centers (M) -0.271∗∗∗ 0.0251
(0.0564) (0.0836)
Exercise Habits t-10 0.0467∗∗∗ 0.0140
(0.00547) (0.0131)




Health t (M) -0.689 0.383
(0.826) (0.575)
Observations 2768 1165 1165
R2 0.252 . .
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Relevance and Independence of Instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Family Income Elicited Risk Elicited Risk
Local Manufacturing Jobs -1.451∗∗∗ -0.00158
(0.363) (0.00208)
Local Manufacturing Jobs (M) -37.59∗∗∗ -0.0163
(12.57) (0.0814)
Could Afford Medical Care t-18 64.46∗∗∗ -0.0642
(4.983) (0.102)
Can Afford Medical Care (M) 44.29∗∗∗ -0.121
(10.70) (0.128)
Family Income 0.00182 0.000517
(0.00176) (0.000645)
Family Income (M) 0.0289
(0.109)
Observations 1977 1165 1165
R2 0.149 . 0.021
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Testing Endogeneity of Health and Income in Elicited Risk Preference
Model
(1) (2) (3)
Elicited Risk Elicited Risk Elicited Risk
Any Health Shock 0.0436 0.0808 0.0440
(0.0424) (0.0827) (0.0427)
Any Health Shock (M) 0.0490 0.0680 0.0465
(0.112) (0.119) (0.111)
Health -0.0230 0.0535 -0.0270
(0.0271) (0.145) (0.0276)
Health t (M) -0.185 0.0486 -0.175
(0.152) (0.464) (0.150)
Age -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗
(0.00521) (0.00511) (0.00533)
Female -0.0269 -0.0199 -0.0128
(0.0314) (0.0340) (0.0350)
Family Income 0.000203 0.000190 0.000698
(0.000134) (0.000135) (0.000590)
Family Income (M) -0.0181 -0.0258 0.0560
(0.0500) (0.0509) (0.101)
Education 0.0125∗ 0.0103 0.00686
(0.00691) (0.00810) (0.00984)
Separated -0.0191 -0.0130 0.00406
(0.0484) (0.0497) (0.0549)
Widowed -0.0843 -0.0917 -0.0691
(0.111) (0.110) (0.109)
Single 0.147 0.156 0.189∗
(0.105) (0.107) (0.114)
Marital Status (M) -0.0509 -0.0536 -0.0409
(0.108) (0.109) (0.107)
Risky Med Prob -0.000576 -0.000537 -0.000566
(0.000514) (0.000523) (0.000516)
Risky Med Prob (M) 0.0806 0.0899 0.0937
(0.128) (0.124) (0.127)
Prob Live 20y -0.000245 -0.000887 -0.000395
(0.000652) (0.00135) (0.000664)
Prob Live 20y (M) -0.268∗∗ -0.305∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.123) (0.0984)
Constant 1.346∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗ 1.294∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.482) (0.358)
Observations 1165 1165 1165
R2 0.026 0.019 0.013
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Any Health Shock 0.0430 (0.0398)
Any Health Shock (M) 0.0481 (0.127)
Health -0.0374 (0.0260)







Marital Status (M) -0.0476 (0.118)
Risky Med Prob -0.000539 (0.000551)
Risky Med Prob (M) 0.0719 (0.139)
Prob Live 20y -0.000318 (0.000649)
Prob Live 20y (M) -0.263∗∗ (0.114)




Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: Summary Statistics: Elicited Risk Preferences Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Elicited Risk Preferences 1165 .45 .51 -1.06 1.36
Any Health Shock 1105 .19 .39 0 1
Any Health Shock Missing 1165 .05 .22 0 1
Excellent 1149 .38 .49 0 1
Fair/Poor 1149 .09 .29 0 1
Missing 1165 .01 .12 0 1
Age at Q13 1165 64.93 2.84 47 87
Female 1165 .38 .49 0 1
Education (years) 1165 17.63 2.18 12 21
Family Income/1000 1013 158.24 131.08 5 500
Family Income Missing 1165 .13 .34 0 1
Separated 1104 .1 .3 0 1
Widowed 1104 .02 .13 0 1
Single 1104 .03 .17 0 1
Missing 1165 .05 .22 0 1
Probability 1147 49.38 28.09 0 100
Missing 1165 .02 .12 0 1
Probability 1149 65.42 26.01 0 100
Missing 1165 .01 .12 0 1
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